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POWERS OF APPOINTMENT*
Eugene Kuntzt

F

OR centuries, the power of appointment has been used as an

excellent tool in planning the disposition of property. Once
used to circumvent law governing the transfer of property, it was
developed into a handy device for family settlements. In the
United States, the power of appointment enjoyed relative obscurity
until the advent of the estate and inheritance tax. Now it has
become a popular and important device for use in minimizing
taxes and for achieving other important objectives of persons seeking to preserve property for the benefit of their descendants. In
the modern complex task of planning an estate of any size, an
understanding of the nature and operation of the power of appointment is essential.
A power of appointment is a capacity on the part of one individual to direct the succession of property without necessarily
having any other interest in the property.' For example, A may
transfer Blackacre to B for life and then to such persons as C may
by will direct. C has, in this illustration, a type of power of
appointment. C does not "own" Blackacre from the standpoint of
*This article is based upon an address before the Institute on Probate and Trust
Law Conducted by the Southwestern Legal Foundation at Dallas, Texas, on October
29, 1954.
tProfessor of Law, University of Oklahoma, College of Law.
1 This paper is intended to be a survey of the nature and operation of the power
of appointment with special reference to its use in estate planning. For detailed
treatment of the law relating to powers of appointment see the following recognized
treatises: 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, Part 23 (1952); THE RESTATEMENT OF
THE LAW OF PROPERTY, §§ 318-369 (1940), 1948 SUPPLEMENT (1949); Simes, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §§ 51-74 (1951); Simes, THE LAW OF FUTURE
INTERESTS, §§ 243-293 (1936); Tiffany, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, 3rd edition,
§§ 672-713 (1939); Thompson, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, §§ 2274-2305. For special treatment see, Casner, Estate Planning-Powers
of Appointment, 64 HAn. L. REV. 185 (1950).
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enjoyment, but he has the power to select the person or persons
who may "own" or enjoy it.
Before seeking a more accurate definition and more complete
description of the operation of the power, definition of terms is
necessary.
1. Donor-The Donor is the person who creates the power. This may
be done by either grant or reservation.
2. Donee-The donee is the person in whom the power is created or
* reserved.
3. Objects-The objects of the power are those persons among whom
the donee is given the power to appoint.
4. Appointees-The appointees are the persons to whom interests are

appointed by the donee.
5. Takers in Default-The takers in default of appointment are the persons who will receive the property if the power is not effectively exercised, whether named or not.
6. Appointive Property-The appointive property covered by a power
is the interest which the donee can create in appointees by an exercise
of the power.

7. Owned Interest-The owned interest is the interest of the donee (other
than his power) in land or other things over which he has a power.

An accurate definition of the power of appointment, then, is:
"A power of appointment is a power created or reserved by a person (the donor) having property subject to his disposition
enabling the donee of the power to designate, within such limits
as the donor may prescribe, the transferees of the property or the
2
shares in which it shall be received."
We must make one more refinement before proceeding. There
is a difference between special powers on one hand and general
powers on the other. By rule of thumb, a general power is one
under which the donee may appoint to himself or his estate. All
other powers are special.
The theory of operation of the power is interesting and a consideration of such theory may make subsequent problems less
2

RESTATEMENT.

PROPERTY

§

318(1), 1940).
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difficult. For most purposes, the appointive property is considered
to pass from the donor of the power rather than from the donee.
For example, A transfers Blackacre to B for life and then to such
persons as C may direct. When C directs that Blackacre should
go to X, X is considered for most purposes to have taken his property interest from A rather than from C.
Theory is consistent with reality and practicality insofar as the
special power is concerned because it appears as a practical matter that C merely filled in the blanks in A's conveyance when he
named X. The law has thus developed with relative uniformity
to the end that the property is considered to have passed from A
for purposes of determining the rights of C's creditors, C's spouse,
and C's heirs. Further, the rule against perpetuities is computed on
the basis of lives in being at the time of the creation of the special
power rather than its exercise.
Insofar as the general power of appointment is concerned,
theory is not consistent with reality and practicality and the development has not been uniform. For all practical purposes, if C can
appoint property in his own favor, he should be looked upon as
being its owner in reality. This, however, is not the invariable attitude of the courts. For purposes of the rights of C's heirs in
absence of appointment, the property is considered to have passed
to A's heirs from A. The creditors of C may not reach the property
in most jurisdictions, although in some jurisdictions, the creditors
may reach the appointive property if the general power is exercised. The rights of a surviving spouse of C do not attach to the
appointive property.
On the other hand, the law has developed in some areas on the
theory that the donee is, for practical purposes, the owner of the
appointive property under the general power. For example, the
rule against perpetuities is computed as if the donee were the
owner; the donee may create new interests, create trusts, etc., as
if he were the owner; and, of greatest importance at the moment,
for purposes of imposing inheritance and estate taxes, the donee
is treated as the practical owner of the property.
A good question at this point would be: "Why ever do such a
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foolish thing as to let someone, not the owner, control property?"
Or, in the case of a retained power of appointment, why retain the
control and not the full ownership? There is a variety of reasons
why the power should be used. The first reason, historically, arose
long before the 16th century. Before the enactment of the Statute
of Wills in 1540, certain estates would not pass by will. The
owner A, could not leave Blackacre by will to B, but he could
transfer the property in such a manner as to reserve a life estate
or even a fee and power of appointment. He could then exercise
the power of appointment by will and Blackacre would go to B
just as effectively as if left to B directly by will. That is, the power
was used to do indirectly that which could not be done directly.
There were other reasons for using the power, too, having to do
with family settlements, creditors, and marital rights in property.
In the early days of the United States, where family settlements
and ancestral estates were not as common as in England, the power
of appointment was little used, at least there was little litigation
involving its use until the coming of estate and inheritance taxes.
With the coming of such taxes, the old device was revived and
readied for service again in an attempt to do by indirection that
which could not be done directly without tax liability.
Perhaps we should examine the general provisions of the federal law imposing estate, gift and income taxes insofar as they
relate directly to powers .of appointment, and then consider the
specific application to a few illustrations.
When the Estate Tax first became effective in 1916, there was
no provision regarding powers in the Act. A few months later,
Treasury regulations which had been issued with no reference to
the subject, were amended to include a provision regarding the
exercise of a general testamentary power.8 In 1918, Congress
added the paragraph that continued up to 1942" and which was
held to require that property which passed by the exercise of a
general power of appointment be included in the donee's estate.5
Prior to 1942, the power was a wonderful device for achieving
3 T.D. 2477.
4INT. RiV. CODE § 811(f)
5

(1939).
Helvering v. Grinnell, 294 U.S. 153, 55 Sup. Ct. 354, 79 L. Ed. 825 (1934).
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flexibility in an estate plan without undesirable tax consequences.
In 1942, complex provisions were added in lieu of the old provisions. Such changes are not material to this discussion because
the 1951 Revenue Act revised the system of taxing property subject to powers of appointment, and such revised system was reenacted in the 1954 Internal Revenue Act. The fundamental pattern is relatively simple to state.
1. Estate Tax.6
a. Pre-1942 powers (created on or before October 21, 1942, with
decedent dying before July 1, 1949 in case of will executed prior
to October 21, 1942.)
Appointed property is includible in the estate only if the power
is general, only if the power is exercised, and only if the property
actually passes by virtue of the power.
A general power could have been reduced to a special power
by partial release prior to Novemebr 1, 1951. Then an exercise
would not be considered the exercise of a general power. By implication and according to the old Estate Tax Regulations, 7 if the
power were reduced to a special power after the 1951 cut-off date,
then the property subject to such power is includible in the estate
if the power is exercised although it is a special power.
b. Post-1942 powers(1) Property subject to general power is included in estate of
donee if:
(a) Donee had the power at death, or,
(b) Donee exercised or released the power under conditions
which would cause it be included in his estate if it were
a transfer of property. (e.g. contemplation of death,
exercise with retained life estate.)
(c) In case of any post-1942 powers, i.e. general or special,
which decedent exercised, by will or under conditions
which would cause it to be included in his estate if it
were a transfer of property, so as to create another
power, i.e., if decedent appointed in the described manner so as to create another power of appointment, any
property subject to such post-1942 power would be included in the estate whether the power were general or

§ 2041 (1954).
7Regulation 105, § 81.24.

6 INT. REv. CODE
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special if the appointment be valid under local law without regard to date of creation of the first power.
(2) Property subject to the donated special power is not included in the estate of the donee unles it is exercised to
create another power.
c. A general power is one which is exercisable in favor of the decedent,
his creditors, his estate, or creditors of his estate. By exclusion,
then, a power is a special one if the donee cannot exercise it in
favor of self, creditors, estate, or creditors of his estate. Further,
a power to invade, according to an ascertainable standard relating
to health, support, education, and maintenance, shall not be deemed
a general power of appointment.
d. Re-exercise in conjunction with other persons:
(1) If a pre-1942 power, then it is not a general power if it must
be exercised with some other person.
(2) If a post-1942 power, it is not a general power if it:
(a) must be exercised with donor of power, or
(b) must be exercised with some person having a substantial
interest adverse to exercise in favor of donee. (e.g. default
taker.)
8

2. Gift Tax.

a. Pre-1942 powers
(1) An exercise of a general power is taxable as a gift.
(2) A failure to exercise or a complete release is not a gift.
(3) A partial release so as to make a special power is not a gift,
if released before November 1, 1951, or within 6 months after
removal of disability if donee was under disability.
b. Post-1942 powers
(1) An exercise or release, partial or complete, of a general power
of appointment is a gift.
(2) A general power for gift tax purposes is the same as the general power for estate tax purposes.
(3) Creation of another power is a taxable gift if the vesting is
thereby validly postponed for a period ascertainable without
regard to the date of creation of the first power.
8 INT. REv. CODE

§ 2514 (1954).
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(4) A lapse of a power can be a gift to the extent that the value
of the property subject to the power exceeds the greater of
$5,000 or 5% of aggregate value of asests out of which the
exercise could be satisfied.

3.

Marital Deduction. 9
Substantially the same provisions appear in both the estate and gift
tax provisions. The new law made two changes in both of them. As
in the old law, a bequest or gift in trust will qualify for the martial
deduction if it is a gift of a life estate with a general power of appointment. The new change is that a legal life estate and general power will
qualify, and further, if the life interest and power relate only to a part
of the property, it will qualify as to such a part. A general power is
defined parenthetically to be a power exerciseable in favor of the donee
spouse or the estate of such donee spouse.

4. Income Tax Problems."
The powers as used in the income tax provisions are broader than
the classical powers of appointment with which we are dealing and
relate generally to retained or granted powers of a character that yield
to the holder of such power the economic satisfaction which the owner
of the property normally enjoys.
From the standpoint of the estate and gift tax, the power of
appointment may fall into one of two possible categories which
I believe to be mutually exclusive although definition is not identical in all parts of the code. If the power is used to secure the
marital deduction, it must be a general one. A necessary consequence is that the property subject to the power must be included
in the estate of the donee unless the power is released in which
case a taxable gift is made.
On the other hand, if the estate of the donee is of concern,
the special power is the device to use. It cannot be used to secure
the martial deduction, but it likewise will not result in the property subject to it being included in the estate of the donee.
In the light of the foregoing, it is obvious that the power of
appointment is a valuable tool for the planning of estates and
fits well into the accepted methods of reducing estate tax, viz: (1)
Use of marital deduction, (2) use of terminable interests to pre9 INT. Riv. CODE §§ 2056, 2523 (1954).
10 INT. Rzv. CODE §§ 671-678 (1954).
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vent inclusion of property in successive estates, and (3) use of
inter vivos gifts to reduce the amount of the eventual estates. Such
methods are used, of course, in combination, also. There are other
devices, too, but they are not relevant to our subject.
In order to have a single illustration for application of all
principles, let us create an hypothetical family with an hypothetical estate. H, the husband, and W, the wife, had three children
born of the marriage, John, Charles and Thomas. Thomas died
leaving a son, Thomas, Jr., and a widow, Vera. There are other
grandchildren who may remain nameless. H has sufficient property
to be concerned about the estate tax. H has all of the desires common to most men regarding the disposition of his wealth. He
desires to provide well for his widow, but he also desires to benefit
his children and his grandchildren. Further, he dislikes the idea
of enriching a successor husband.
Consider his possible simple plans.
1. By will, H may leave his property in fee to W. This plan provides a
maximum of flexibility but does not assure him that his children will
ever enjoy the property and gives no assurance regarding the successor husband. The plan has one merit and one merit only, and that is,
he enjoys the maximum marital deduction. This advantage is moderated, however, by the fact that the property, if not dissipated, will be
taxed again in his widow's estate.
2. By will, H may leave his property directly or in trust to W for life with
remainder in fee to John, Charles and Thomas, Jr., but this has objectionable features, also. First, W may require more than the income
from the property. This may be taken care of by adding a right to
invade the corpus in case of a trust, and if such right is measured by
proper standards regarding health and maintenance, it will not be
taxed in the widow's estate upon her death. Another difficulty is that
W has no control over the disposition of the property and may possibly
not enjoy the degree of consideration from her sons and grandchildren
that she would otherwise enjoy. Most objectionable, however, is its inflexibility. John may not need the property when W dies, whereas
Charles may have been the victim of a disaster that has made him entirely dependent upon others. Other reasons may develop why he would
have preferred one over the others, either among children or grandchildren or their spouses.
3. A better solution possibly lies in the direction of a power of appoint-
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ment. By will, H could leave his property on trust for W for life (with
right to invade) with a special power of appointment, i.e. a power to
appoint to one or more of his descendants. This method yields greater
flexibility, assures W of support and maintenance, guards against enriching the successor husband, and permits W to exert parental discipline over her family. The only difficulty is that, although it is not
taxable in W's estate, H does not enjoy the marital deduction for his
own estate.
4. Possibly a variation might lie in the direction of a similar trust arrangement, but with a general power of appointment in the wife. This would
yield all of the non-tax advantages plus greater flexibility, but could
permit enrichment of the successor husband. Further, such a trust
would qualify for the marital deduction, but unfortunately, would be
taxed in W's estate upon her death whether she exercised the power
or not.
5. A better testamentary plan would include elements of several of the
foregoing suggestions. By will, H could create a widow's trust (with
power to invade) with general power of appointment on a sufficient
amount of property to secure maximum benefit from the marital
deduction. A testamentary trust could be created on the residue of the
property giving W a life interest plus a special power of appointment.
This would not qualify for the marital deduction, but that is immaterial because the maximum marital deduction was realized by the other
trust. Further, flexibility is realized; as to the property subject to the
special power, the successor husband is frustrated; and the property
will not be taxed in the estate of W even though she exercises the
power. Taxwise and perhaps otherwise, this is the best plan utilizing
a testamentary scheme which we have considered. There is another
step to consider in refinement of such plan. W could execute a release
of her general power of appointment, pay a gift tax, and still be better
off in that the property will not be included in her estate.
6. Consider the feasibility of inter vivos gifts in trust with powers of
appointment. Before going further, there are certain advantages to be
gained by an inter vivos transfer aside from the tax considerations.
For example, there are reasons not associated with tax why H may
desire to set up a trust with a life interest reserved, a life interst in his
wife, and possible provisions for continuing the trust during minority
of his children.
There is no interruption of management of the trust, no loss of
income, no additional expense upon the death of the various
parties, no delay or expense through probate. Further, there is no
likelihood of attack as there could be upon the will, or if there
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is an attack, it would probably be during the lifetime of the settlor
and he would be present to defend his act. There would be no
problem of the widow's taking a forced share or insisting upon
dower, or its statutory substitute. If H persuaded W of the advantages of the transaction long enough to secure her joinder in the
trust instrument, he would not have to worry about her changing
her mind after his death and taking against his testamentary plan.
To a certain extent, H may also select the law to be applied to
the trust.
From the standpoint of taxation, inter vivos transactions have
an advantage up to a point. Until that point is reached, they are
valuable in reducing the estate of the donor, the gift tax being
smaller, and not being paid out of the gift itself. In the plan last
examined, it would be good planning to compute the amount which
could be given with advantage and make the inter vivos gift of
the life interest plus special power. This would not qualify for
the marital deduction on the gift tax, but it would serve to reduce
the amount of the estate, and thus the estate tax. Of course, if the
inter vivos gift were too great, full advantage could not be taken
of the marital deduction in the estate tax. This is strictly a problem in computation if tax is the only remaining consideration to
control the decision. It is true that the marital deduction on the
gift tax has been lost by using the special power of appointment,
but by the same token, the property will not be taxed subsequently
in the estate of W.
Up to this point, in considering the planning problems which
surround the power of appointment, we have considered only the
question of creation of the power. We should consider, briefly, the
exercise of a power.
Any pre-1942 general power should be carefully considered before being exercised. A failure to exercise the pre-1942 power is
not a tax-significant event, whereas the exercise of a general power
may result in a gift tax if exercised inter vivos, or will result in
the appointive property being included in the estate of the donee
if exercised by will. For these reasons, the default provisions
should be carefully examined before any pre-1942 power is exer-
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cised. Consider also the desirability of a general will provision
which declares the intention not to exercise any power unless
specific reference is made thereto. Consider, too, a general declaration of disclaimer or renunciation.
Regarding post-1942 powers, there is tax-significance in the
exercise of the special power only. The mere existence of the general power is the tax-significant event. With regard to the special
power, there is no taxable event in the exercise or non-exercise
unless the special power is exercised so as to create another power,
or is exercised in such a manner that the property would have
been included in the estate of the donee if the situation had been
one of property transfer.
By far the most complex problems involving powers
are those
which are present during the planning phase of the estate planner's
operation. There remain, however, a few difficult problems which
involve the draft-phase of the operation. One cause for difficulty
in drafting powers of appointment is the lack of established law
on all phases of the operation of the power. A further difficulty
arises because in many instances there is no way of knowing as
a certainty by which state's law the instrument will be construed
and enforced. The will may involve land in many states, or the
testator may change domicile. Since there is uncertainty in any
event, it is best to make provisions for many contingencies. It is
possible to tranform uncertainty to certainty because the intention
of the donor of the valid power is the thing sought. In the exercise,
it is the intention of the donee.
There are numerous details in drafting which do
not merit
lengthy discussion here but which must be mentioned.
A few drafting problems may be pointed out in our hypothetical case. Suppose we draft a deed of trust on one-third of H's
property creating a life estate and special power of appointment
in W. We draft a will for H which will create two trusts, each
of one-half of the estate to be held for W for life with a special
power in W over one and a general power in W over the other.
The problem of distinguishing between the special and general
power is a small one. Statutory language should be used, syn-
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onyms should be avoided. In drafting the special power, merely
provide that the donee does not have the power to appoint to
herself, her estate, her creditors, or the creditors of her estate.
In drafting the general power, merely provide that she may
appoint in favor of herself. In the drafting phase, the tax pitfalls
are few in number and obvious in nature. It is the non-tax pitfall
that causes the greatest difficulty.
A common shortcoming in case of the special power of appointment is a failure on the part of the draftsman to indicate whether
the power is exclusive or non-exclusive, i.e., may the donee exclude
one or more of the objects. Unless care is taken to give such power
to exclude members of the class the special power will be construed to be non-exclusive. In our hypothetical, unless we so provide, W could not appoint so as to deprive John, Charles or
Thomas Jr. of an interest. Having once inadvertently created a
non-exclusive power, the draftsman has inadvertently created another problem, and this is the problem of how much must the
donee appoint as a minimum to the objects. Since the law is
not established in all jurisdictions on both subjects, the matter
should be the subject of express provision.
Assume that we have had the foresight to provide for an exclusive special power, i.e., to appoint in favor of one or more of H's
descendants. Let us also assume that John and Charles are sufficiently wealthy that an exercise of the power in their favor
would only create estate planning problems for them. It is the
desire of W to appoint the property, then, to the grandchildren.
It is obvious that she may do so in favor of Thomas, Jr., because
technically he is a descendant, but it is not obvious as to the children of John and Charles. There are decisions to the effect that
appointment cannot be made in their favor as descendants so long
as their parents live. This also is a situation calling for special
provision in creating the special power. Suppose W desired to
appoint in favor of Vera. Assume a fact situation where John
and Charles are independently wealthy and there is likewise no
particular reason for benefiting their children. W desires to benefit
Thomas, Jr., who is a minor. Unless special provision is made,
this must be done directly in favor of Thomas, Jr., and not in-
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directly through Vera the mother. It might very well develop that
W, and even H if he were alive, would be anxious to do all possible for the loyal Vera who has devoted her life to rearing the
child of Thomas. Unfortunately, it cannot be done unless special
provision has been made in the instrument creating the power.
Such provision could easily provide for the power to appoint in
favor of the spouse or the estate of any deceased descendant and
further provide that remote issue with living parents will be considered to be descendants for the purpose of exercising the power.
Suppose further that instead of being affluent, John is poor and,
worse, is a drunkard. W would like to appoint in his favor, but
W feels confident that such an appointment would inure to the
benefit of the corner liquor store. First, W could, if we had the
foresight to so provide, appoint in favor of John's children or
spouse. But suppose that we are actually in sympathy with John
and wish to help him rather than his dependents. A spendthrift
trust is indicated. Can W appoint in trust with spendthrift provisions? That is a good question unless H specially so provided in
creating the power. Possibly W would like to appoint successive
interests. She may certainly do so if we specifically give her the
power.
Suppose W fails to exercise the power, where does the property
go? Here again, it is a good idea to spell out default provisions
in detail.
Provision should be made for a partial release of the power.
Texas, as have other states, has the standard form of statute authorizing partial releases and providing for methods of releasing.
It may be desirable to provide in addition that a partial release
may be made by filing such release in the court which admitted
the will to probate.
The Internal Revenue Code refers to disclaimer and renunciation of a power of appointment and provides that they will not
amount to an exercise. How does one disclaim or renounce a
power? When is a disclaimer a release? Possibly a provision
would be helpful here which would describe a simple method of
disclaiming.
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There also may be the need of a hotchpot clause. Suppose, in
the case of a special power, that John, Charles, and Thomas Jr.
are the named objects. They are likewise named as takers in
default. If an appointment in equal shares were to be ineffective,
for some technical reason as to John, it would go by default
equally to the three takers in default with the result that John
would take one-ninth whereas, Charles and Thomas, Jr. would take
each one-third plus one-ninth. Where more than one power is involved, the risk of inequality is increased. This danger can be
avoided by a hotchpot clause which would provide in substance
that before any person could take in default of appointment, he
must first contribute any share which he received by appointment
to be distributed along with the property distributed in default.
Suppose W had prepared a will before H prepared his final
will. Would W's will exercise the general power of appointment
acquired through H's will? Could such will exercise the power
if such an intention were found? To remove doubt, a specific
expression of intention could provide that the testator does nor
does not intend to exercise all powers, including those created
after the execution of the will.
Other problems of drafting are the usual problems which are
solved by using the English language in an accurate manner. For
assistance in avoiding the less obvious drafting pitfalls, however,
a check-list is attached, which I hope will prove to be helpful.
SUGGESTIONS FOR CREATING POWERS OF APPOINTMENT

The possible variations of forms for creating the power of appointment are infinite in number. The principal evil to be avoided
is future difficulty in determining the exact scope of the power.
Since the scope of the power is a matter of expressed intention,
care should be taken to express the full intention of the donor on
all elements of the power. The check-list which follows should be
helpful.
1. Is the power to be general or special for tax purposes?
a. Is the donee restricted from appointing in favor of himself, his
estate, his creditors, or the creditors of his estate?
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b. May the donee appoint only in conjunction with the creator of
the power?
c. May the donee appoint only in conjunction with a person having a
substantial interest adverse to appointment in favor of the donee?
(Tax-wise, the power is special if the answer to a, b, or c, supra,
is affirmative.)
d. In the case of a power to invade, is there a limiting ascertainable
standard relating to health, etc., of the donee?
2. How is the power to be exercised?
a. Must specific reference be made to the instrument creating it?
b. Is the power exercisable inter vivos?
(1) Immediately?
(2) After some lapse of time or occurrence of an event?
c. Is the power to be exercised only by will?
(1) Is a prior executed will sufficient to constitute a valid exercise?
(2) Is there to be any limit on the time within which the will
exercising the power must be admitted to probate?
3. If the power is special, is it to be exclusive or non-exclusive?
a. May the donee appoint so as to deny benefit to any member of the
designated class?
b. If the donee may not exclude a member of the class from benefit,
what is the minimum to be given each member?
4. If the power is special, among which persons may the donee appoint?
a. Is the designation of the class clear?
b. May the donee appoint in favor of the spouse or estate of any deceased member of the class?
c. May the donee appoint in favor of remote issue with living parents?
5. What interests may be appointed?
a. May the donee appoint less than a fee; may he appoint successive
interests?
b. May the donee appoint in trust; may he impose spendthrift provisions?
c. May the donee create a new power of appointment?
6. Have gifts in default of appointment been described?
7. Has provision been made for a method of release of the power?
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8. Has provision been made for a method of disclaimer or renunciation
of the power?
9. Has the desirability of a hotchpot clause been considered?
10. If the power is a general testamentary power or a special power, has
the rule against perpetuities been carefully considered?

Consider the use of a general provision to be inserted in the
will, deed, or declaration of trust, which provision expresses an
intention on such of the foregoing points as are relevant. Such
provision could read, for example: "With regard to any power
of appointment created in this instrument, the donee of any such
power shall have the following powers in addition to and in no
way restricting such powers as he would otherwise have: . . ."
SUGGESTIONS FOR EXERCISING POWER OF APPOINTMENT
In exercising the power of appointment, the following check-list
of questions should be helpful:
1. When was the power created, i.e. when was the conveyance or will
executed? (If executed on or before October 21, 1952, an exercise of
the power may result in an estate tax or gift tax when a failure to exercise the power may not.)
2. What are the default provisions? (Exercise of the power may be
unnecessary in any event.)
3. Has the provision creating the power been checked to determine
whether or not the proposed exercise exceeds the power?
4. Have appointees been described with clarity?
5. Have alternative provisions been made in the event of the prior death
of the appointee?
6. In case of testamentary power, does the testator express an intention
to exercise powers acquired after execution of the will?
7. Has the proposed exercise been checked for validity in the light of
the rule against perpetuities?
SUGGESTED GENERAL FORMS

Exercise of Power of Appointment by Specific Provision
"I exercise the power of appointment given to me in ... (describe will
or deed) ...so as to appoint all of the property subject to such power at
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the date of my death to the following persons who survive me: ...(naming
them) ...and if none of such persons do survive me, then to ...(describing additional appointees as may be necessary)."
An alternative provision could possibly be: "... and if none of such
persons do survive me, then I do not desire to exercise such power of appointment notwithstanding any general or residuary provision contained
herein."
Exercise of Power of Appointment by Residuary
Appointing Provision
"All other property which I own at the time of my death or over which I
might have any power of appointment, including but not limited to such
powers of appointment that may have been created subsequent to the execution of this will, I devise, bequeath and appoint to ..."

Refusal to Exercise Power of Appointment
"If, at the time of my death, I have any power of appointment (from a
described anticipated source or which was created prior to 1942) from any
source whatever except those described herein, it is my intention not
to exercise such power in whole or in part, notwithstanding any general or
residuary provision contained herein."
Creation of Special Testamentary Power of Appointment
(The power of appointment created by this form is tax-free to the donee,
but does not qualify for the marital deduction.)
(After making provision for the preceding interest) "... and then to one
or more of my descendants who are living at the time of my death and who
are not creditors of my said wife or of her estate, to such extent, and in such
amounts or proportions, and in such lawful interests or estates, whether
absolute or in trust, as my said wife may appoint by will. Appointment may
be in favor of any descendant, however remote, even though the parents of
such appointee be living."
(If the property is in trust, the following language would be more appropriate after provisions for the preceeding interests:) "... and then said
trustee shall pay over and distribute all undistributed net income and principal of the trust, as it is then constituted, to or for the benefit of any one
or more of my descendants ..."
(A further appropriate alternative provision should follow.)
"In the event that such power of appointment is not effectively exercised
in whole or in part by my wife, then any property which fails to pass by
virtue of such exercise shall go to ..."
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Creation of General Power of Appointment over Trust Property
(The power of appointment created by this form qualifies for the marital
deduction, but the donee will have gift or estate tax consequences.)
(After providing for life estate for wife) "... Upon the death of my
wife, John Doe, the trustee shall pay over and distribute all undistributed
net income and principal of the trust, as it is then constituted, to or for the
benefit of person or persons, corporation or corporations, or to the estate
of my wife, in such amounts or proportions, and in such lawful interests or
estates, whether absolute or in trust, as my said wife may by will appoint;
and, in the event that such power of appointment is not effectively exercised
in whole or in part by my wife, then any property which fails to pass by
virtue of such exercise shall ..

Creation of General Power of Appointment over Legal Title
(The same language as is used in the preceding form would be effective
with slight variation to be applicable to legal title.)
(After providing for legal life estate for wife) "... and upon the death
of my wife, Jane Doe, then to such person or persons ... "

